The Unlikely Revival of Germany's Far Left

Not so long ago, observers of German politics would have been clear on one thing — that the far-left party, Die Linke, was in serious trouble. 

Struggling to reach the 5% threshold necessary for parliamentary representation in most post-pandemic polling, this did not seem an unreasonable conclusion. Splits in the party suggested that come 2025 Die Linke would be on life support. Or dead and buried.

Tracing its roots back to East Germany and the Kremlin puppet Socialist Unity Party (SED), the old Die Linke simply found issues like the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic too divisive to solve. The party split and former party leader Sahra Wagenknecht formed a new grouping bearing her name — the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW.)

Concerns that losing Wagenknecht and her voters might prove the death knell for Die Linke were misconceived. The party won nearly 9% of the vote and increased its seats in the Bundestag.

Its co-leader Heidi Reichinnek, a 36 year-old who has been pictured with a chainsaw, has led an extraordinary revival. Initial data suggested that the party gained 25% of the vote from those between 18 and 24 years old, more than the Social Democrats and Greens combined. This positions the party as the biggest among young voters, capitalising on losses from the two parties mentioned above. The same data shows a similar pattern among previous non-voters — Die Linke won an incredible 27% of those who had not voted in 2021.

Reichinnek is a rising star. With over 560,000 followers on Tiktok, her speech attacking the CDU and Friedrich Merz’s co-operation with the AfD on an immigration vote in the Bundestag, won attention in the media both in Germany and internationally. It clearly demonstrated the party’s opposition to the AfD at a time when the supposed “firewall” between the mainstream and the far-right was at its weakest. 

This is where Die Linke has outperformed both its mainstream and populist opponents – the party has consistently demonstrated a clear difference from far-right parties and BSW’s populist left approach by advocating unapologetic socially liberal policies. The party has promoted drug legalisation, rent controls, and redistributive wealth policies, and is also notably pro-Russian and hostile to Ukraine’s democracy.

It has maintained its traditional left-wing ideology but modernized its approach. This has proved important in appealing to both young voters and the disillusioned who generally don’t vote, and showed particular success in Berlin and Leipzig, among other urban areas. 

This is most notable in Berlin’s Neukolln, where a committed ground operation proved incredibly effective, doubling the party’s vote share in the district, leading to the election of Ferat Koçak, a member of the state legislature who was previously targeted by the far-right extremist group, NSU 2.0. 

Der Linke’s former comrades in the BSW did not perform as well, but very nearly vaulted the 5% barrier that wins Bundestag representation. Instead it won an agonizing (for the party) 4.97% and was denied any seats.

Wagenknecht, an Iranian-German communist raised by her grandparents in East Germany, formed her party early last year. It is sometimes referred to, confusingly as “left conservative.” Most certainly populist, it is built around the personal brand of its leader, and an unusual mix of policies. 

Whilst it matches the traditional left-wing economics of the party it split from and a similar Kremlin-friendly outlook, the BSW opposes what it terms “lifestyle leftists”, drawing on socially conservative attitudes towards immigration and issues like trans rights. Like the far-right AfD, it expressed concern regarding what it labels as “ideological coercion” during the COVID-19 pandemic, with Wagenknecht calling for open “debate” about vaccination. 

Yet despite significant media attention and numerous Wagenknecht appearances on German talk shows, and the party’s attempt to brand itself as a new option, the BSW made few inroads with previous non-voters, with early exit polls placing this group’s support for the BSW only narrowly above its polling in general. 

The far left has attracted less of the focus than the far-right AfD. The election has been a clear success for Der Linke. The loss of the small c conservative old guard of the party seems to have allowed it to shake off some of its Cold War brand. No longer just the communist successor party, Die Linke now has a clear position of its own, and one that has paid electoral dividends. For now the mood in Karl-Liebknecht-Haus will be jubilation.

And what of the BSW? It clearly has an appeal. Perhaps something unexpected will happen. In one debate, an AfD radical was so won over by Wagenknecht’s pro-Russian outlook that he offered her a place in the far-right party.

Jack Daniel Dean is a Ph.D. candidate at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies, where he researches Central and Eastern Europe. He primarily works on Romanian politics, but his research interests address the history and politics of the region more broadly.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Comprehensive Report

By CEPA International Leadership Council

CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.

February 10, 2025

Learn More